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INTRODUCTION

"In every human group there is a diversity of opinion, taste,
inclination, and outlook which, when the group is organized in the
form of a society, creates a majority and one or more minorities." 1
National minorities are formed by groups of peoples with a national
consciousness, usually accompanied by linguistic and cultural differences,
distinct from the majority.

The problem of dealing with nationalistic

groups has faced many nations throughout the course of history.
Certainly it is a problem that might well be considered among the
chief concerns of Poland.
Poland, situated at the crossroads of trade between eastern and
western Europe, has been an arena for opposing armies throughout the
centuries, and her avaricious neighbors have frequently swooped down
upon her as delectable prey in their rapacious desires for more land.
Though "the boundaries of Poland have shifted as the sands of the
seashore" 2 and though disaster long blotted its name from the list
of countries, "nothing is more characteristic of Poland than a certain
basic persistence that argues foundations made not of sand but of soul." 3

1 Azcarte, P. De. League of Nations and National Minorities.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1943, 3.
2 A Symposium. Contemporary Europe. D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,

N.Y.,

3

~.,

1941, 415.
428.

1

2

The original Polish kingdom as it grew up in the tenth, eleventh,
and twelfth centuries under its first dynasty, the house of the Piasts,
was a comparatively small state.

"It embraced the area which forms

ethnographic Poland today, and also the rest of Silesia and Pomerania.
Having the Oder for a part of its western boundary and a broad strip
of Baltic coast line, Poland in its earliest period enjoyed better
natural frontiers than it was ever later to possess." 4
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries ushered in an era of
vicissitudes for Poland.

The invasions and devastations of the Mongols

coupled with civil wars among her princes and partitioning among her
neighbors not only weakened the kingdom but rent it asunder.
So complete was the ruin wrought by
the invasion, that foreign capital and
labour were needed to rehabilitate the
count~J.
This state of affairs led to a
great influx of German and Jewish colonists,
who found the circums~ances highly favourable
to their settlement. ~

The skilled German artisans and craftsmen introduced into Poland the
industries and arts of Western Europe, "while the Jewish merchants
found full scope for their talents in buying, selling, and transporting
native and foreign goods." 6 Towns and cities increased in number
and importance, and trade made great progress under the influence of thes

4

C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord. Some Problems of the Peace Conference.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1920, 15975 Ninian Hill. Poland and the Polish Question. F. A. Stokes, N.Y.,
1915, 20.
-6 Ibid.

•
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two groups of foreigners who settled in Poland at this time.
By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the republic of
Poland was
the freest state in Europe, the state in which
the greatest degree of constitutional, civic,
and intellectual liberty prevailed. In an '
age of religious persecution and chronic
religious wars, Poland knew no such troubles;
it offered almost complete toleration and an
asylum to those fleeing from persecution in
all western lands. Like the United states
today, Poland was at that time the meltingpot of Europe, the haven for the poor and
oppressed of all the neighboring countries-Germans, Jews, Czechs, Magyars, Armenians,
Tartars, Russians, and others. The complications
of the nationality problem in Poland today
are due in no small measure to the great
numbers of aliens who here found a refuge from
political and religious persecution. 7
The welding of these conflicting racial elements into one nation
has constituted one of Poland's greatest problems.

It has become a

heritage, along with her position as buffer-state between powerful
neighbors, which continually keeps her anxious and turbulent, and the
temperamental, headstrong, ambitious Pole has not yet found the remedy
which will bring about a solution.
In order to understand more fully the concept of nationalism as

a conflicting element in Polish integrity it is necessary to seek the
root of its beginning and trace its development through the centuries.

7 Haskins and Lord, 166.

4
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt a survey of the relations
between Poland and two of her strong nationalistic groups, the Jews
and the Germans, as they existed before 1918 and their status as
minority groups after that period up to the outbreak of the second
World War.

CHAPTER I

THE JEWS AND GERMANS IN POLAND PRIOR TO THE WORLD WAR
No country in Europe contains so many
of the Jewish race as Poland. There, as
elsewhere, they form a people apart.
Centuries have come and gone, but they
remain as much strangers and pilgrims in the
land of their adoption as when they first
entered. 8
The Jews first came to Poland in considerable numbers in the
ninth century.

Invited by the King of Poland in order to build up

Polish commerce, the Jews willingly left Germany and Bohemia where
they were being persecuted, to settle in a land of adoption where
things were more pleasant for them.
When the Jews entered Poland there were only two fixed classes
in that country, the land-owning nobles and the peasants working the
soil.

The Jews were to serve as the third estate.
Because of their special function, they
were held by the rulers of Poland in high
regard. Their status was guaranteed by
charters. The oldest of these charters
was given to the Jews of Posen in 1264 by
Bo1es1av, Prince of Great Poland. 9

To distinguish it from the provincial or local privileges granted

8 Hill, .53.
9 Simon Segal.
1938, 17.5.

The New Poland and the Jews.

Lee Furman, Inc ., N. Y• ,
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to Jews it came to be known as the "Jewish statute" (statuta Judeorum).
Copies of this Charter of Privileges are still extant and prove that
the Jews in Poland were treated with toleration at a time when they
were being persecuted elsewhere.

Some of the most interesting clauses

in the Charter are the following:
(1)

In cases against a Jew a Christian
alone cannot bear witness: Jews must
also do so.

(3)

A Jew may take any article as a pledge
except those used in Church or soaked
in blood.

(6)

When a pledge
Jew swears he
the Christian
lent upon the
thereof.

(7)

When a Christian pledge is lost, by fire
or by theft, whilst in a Jew's keeping,
the Jew may free himself from the responsibility thereof by oath.

(8)

The Jews in quarrels amongst themselves
are excluded from the Polish tribunals;
they shall remain under the protection
of the King, or a Wojewoda (Governor
of a district).

(9)

He who wounds a Jew shall pay a fine
and the costs of his cure.

has been stolen and the
did not know of it, then
must pay him the capital
pledge and the interest

(10) He who murders a Jew shall pay a fine and
suffer confiscation of his property.
(11) He who strikes a Jew shall pay a fine.
(12) Jews shall not pay higher taxes than the
towns-people.

7
(14)

A christian who spoils a Jewish
cemetary shall suffer the confiscation
of his estate and pay a fine besides.

(18) He who throws stones at a Jewish
school shall give the Wojewoda two
pounds of pepper.
(~

When there is no proof as to who has
murdered a Jew, we will give legal
protection against the suspected man.

(24)

No man shall be quartered upon a Jew.

(26)

The abduction of a Jewish child shall
be considered as a theft.

(21)

When a pledge has been in a Jew's possession for a year and a day, it becomes
his property.

(28)

Jews cannot be forced to give back
pledges upon their feast days.

(29)

Those who take them away by force shall
pay a fine.

(30)

The Jew may not be accused of using
Christian blood.

(35)

In night attacks the neighbours must
lend the Jews aid under pain of a fine.

(36)

Jews may buy all kinds of goods and
touch bread and other eatables. 10

The Jews freely profited by this Charter for the next century.
By

its provision they were under the direct jurisdiction of the King

to whom they paid taxes, and not under the jurisdiction of the cities

10

Beatrice C. Baskerville.

N.Y., 1906, 221-222.

The Polish Jew.

The Macmillan Co.,

•
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in which they lived.

"Harm to the Jew was considered harm to the

King's treasury, and punishable by fine." 11
During the fourteenth century many Jews left Germany to settle
in Poland and King Casimer the Great (1333-1370), who was trying to
develop the economic life of his country, welcomed them but under his
successor, King Ludwig of Hungary, the Jews began to suffer reverses
in popularity.

Their charter was modified and when the Kings of the

House of Jagiellon began to reign they

~ere

ordered to wear red

patches upon their clothes and Tellow caps to distinguish them from
the rest of the population." 12 By the fifteenth century a wave of
anti-Semitism had swept over Poland and the country that had once
been a haven of security for the Jew now became a place of persecution
for his race.

After the popular passion died down and the Jew once

more emerged into being, restrictions met him at every turn until,
in 1551 King Sigismund II granted the Jews the right to nominate their
own rabbis.

Stephan Batory (1576-1586) extended their privileges

giving their Kahals the right to govern the internal affairs of their
Communes.
government.

From then on the Jews of Poland enjoyed considerable selfThey were not deemed regular members of the municipalities

11 Segal, 115.
12

Baskerville, 222.

9
but were granted charters by the nobility or Szlachta, and the right
to settle in groups upon their land.

"Thus the Jews became more and

more separated and began to exist as a national group within the

country.~ 13

The liberal conditions under Which they were allowed to

live prevented fusion between the Jews and the Poles, unconsciously
sowing the seeds of future conflict.
Yet the Pole used the Jew constantly; in fact it is difficult
to see how he could have gotten on without him.

The easy-going Pole

entrusted the Jew with every business and from him he borrowed money.
All that the Pole lacked in business capacity and moral courage the
Jew possessed to an extraordinary degree.

"It is characteristic of

the Polish nature that anti-Semitism does not prevent the Jew from
earning a living in those very pursuits for which he is most detested." 14
Aristocratic Poles employ Jews to superintend their affairs because
they can not take the trouble to submit them to the hands of a fellow
Pole who will worry them with formalities and require time without
limit in which to get the business done.

It was the Pole who, happy

to have financial aid always at hand, developed the Jew's money-lending
propensities.
All other occupations were proscribed. Not
being able to possess land, he could not
cultivate the soil; not being able to carry

13

Ibid., 224.

14 !6IO.,

66.

10

arms, he could not become a knight. Even
the pursuit of crafts was forbidden him when
the t'ownspeople found out how apt he was.
His one monopoly was usury, and his only
occupation commerce. Little wonder that he
clung to both and exce~led in these two means
of earning a living. 15
Originally there was no commerce between members of a community,
no buying and selling at all.

Individual fortunes could only be made

by entering into relations with the external world.

Thence came the

necessity and importance of the fairs where Jews, foreign peddlers,
and town merchants transacted business with the Polish peasants.
Gradually the fair became a place where everybody could be treated as
an outsider and money transactions could be concluded even with
one's neighbor.
It happened, and may happen still~ that
when a farmer has a horse which his neighbor
wants to buy they both go to the fair, and there,
after the first has pretended to wait for a
buyer and the second to search for a horse,
they meet and conclude the transaction. Of
course neither of them acknowledges that he
intended to make the transaction beforehand.
Actually the custom is almost broken down,
but the peasant still does not like to buy
from or sell to his neighbor, because he
feels morally bound by the principle of economic
equivalence and cannot hoge to do a particularly
good piece of business. 10
Since early Poland had no native bourgeoisie it was the Jews

15 Ibid., 221.
16 wrIIiam I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki. The Polish Peasant in
Europe and America. Alfre.9. A. Knopf, N.Y. 0927, I, 184-185.-

11
who principally constituted its middle class.

The Jew performed the

necessary commercial tasks beneath the dignity and beyond the capacity
of the gentry.

He served as an intermediary between the nobles and

the peasants.
Not only the noble but the peasant, as well, uses the Jew in
Poland.

Each peasant village owes its existence and maintenance in

great measure to its Jewish occupants.
The Jewish shop-keeper in a peasant village
is usually also a liquor-dealer without license,
a banker lending money at usury, often also
.
a receiver of stolen goods and (near the border)
a contrabandist. The peasant needs and fears
him, but at the same time despises him always
and hates him often. The activity of these
country shop-keepers is the source of whatever
anti-Semitism there is in the peasant masses. 11
Yet it is the Jew who holds the secret of a thousand homes for
"he has crept into every Polish household from the palace to the manor,
from the farmhouse to the cabin.

He has become a despised necessity." 18

The civil position of the Jews remained about the same in Poland
until the year 1191 when the constitution of the third of May gave
them equal civil and national rights.

It removed all the disabilities

which had hitherto pressed upon the Jews.

From now on

the Jews, who had hitherto only enjoyed the
toleration of the Government, were henceforth
to be considered as responsible members of

11

Ibid., II, 1200-1201.

18 Baskerville,

65.

12

the community; the country had therefore the
right to demand that they should have full
advantage of a secular education. All distinctions of dress, of places of abode, and
of legislation were to be removed, together
with all differences but that of religion,
which was free to all. All branches of
industry were open to them. Their Communes
were to have a voice in the Government of the
country. They were to be allowed to occupy
government posts and live in any districts
of the towns or parts of the country they
wished. They might and must share the
military service with the rest of the community; they were to be admitted into all
posts, ranks and positions upon perfect equality
with Christians. Rewards and punishments,
honours and dishonours were to be the same
for all. In twenty years' time the! were to
be allowed to buy landed property. 9
Had Poland been allowed to carry out these reforms, the history of her
Jews might, perhaps, have been differently written.
to be.

But it was not

Poland fell, and with it fell the Polish constitution.

The Jewish problem developed differently in the divided Poland
of the nineteenth century.
own policy.

Of the partitioning powers, each had its

The majority of the Jews became subjects of the Tzar and

Polish antipathy soon fanned into hostility under the pressure of
Russian anti-Semitism.

In Prussian Poland, the Jewish element that

remained was kept within bounds by the semi-official anti-Semite

19

Ibid., 234.

•
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tendencies of the Government, but many of the Jews in this section
were attracted to the rapidly growing industrial centers of western
Germany and migrated there.

"Under Austria, where the Jews obtained

real equality of rights, a large measure of assimilation between
educated Jews and the Polish educated class was effected. tt 20
Throughout her period of captivity though, Poland never ceased
to be.
The partitioning Powers had suceeded in
erasing Poland from the map, but had signally
failed to obliterate Polish nationalism.
The Polish people remained a national unity
in language and literature, traditions and
religion, despite the dismemberment of their
country and the protracted efforts of its
despoilers to Russify or Germanize it. In
brief, they were what they were--Poles, forming
a Nation compacted together and distinguished
from other nations by the thousand years of
its history, whether in the day of glory or
the night of eclipse. 21
Submersed Poland signally failed to learn the lesson experience
might have taUGht her.

With her rebirth the problem of handling the

nationalistic groups found within her borders was no better solved than
before the time Poland had become such a group herself within the
grasp of the powers that surrounded her.

*

*

*

The Germans, like the Jews, first came to Poland as inn ted
20

21

Roman D.yboski. Poland. Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y., 1933, 176.
Robert.Machray. The Poland of Pilsudski. E. P. Dutton and Co.,
N.Y., 1937, 26.

•
14.
guests.

In the year 1225 Conrad, Duke of Mazovia, seeking to safe-

guard his lands from the raids of the Baltic ?russians, unwisely invited
the Teutonic Knights to settle on the border of Poland.

The Knights

succeeded not only in checking the attacks of the Baltic Prussians but

•
in establishing
a German colony which became a formidable advance
post of the "Drangnach Osten" in that region.

By the next century they'

had seized Polish territories in eastern Pomerania and endangered the
country's access to the Baltic Sea.

"Poland thus inherited a problem

that was to tax the ingenuity of her ablest rulers and eventually was
to threaten the very existence of the state." 22
With the influx of German settlers in Poland after the Mongol
inva.sion large portions of devastated territories were repopulated
and built up.

Complete assimilation of this foreign element without

recourse to pressure took place in a short time giving evidence of the
vitality and cultural solidarity of the Polish nation.
Throughout the centuries, emigration from Germany to poland continued.

Under the famous Magdeburg Law the German settlers had terri-

toria1 privileges beyond those ever enjoyed by the Jews.

Unlike the

Jews, however, the Germans became "po1onized tf in the course of time and
soon ceased to exist as a separate factor in the population.

It was

only after the partitions the German "islands" began to appear in Poland.

22

Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed).
Press, Berkley, 1945, 37.

Poland.

University of California

...

15
When part of Poland fell subject to Germany at the time of the
third partition of the country, Prince von Bulow clearly explained
the policy Germany intended to pursue and as Ninian Hill puts it,
"No Pole could have penned a more damning indictment of German policy
than has the ex-Imperial Chancellor." 23

Quoting from his book

"Imperial Germany", he gives the key to the policy in the following
sentences.
Nothing is farther from the aims of our
policy in the Eastern Marches, he writes with
blank unctuosity, than a fight against the
Poles; its object is to protect, maintain,
and strengthen the German nationality among
the Poles; consequently it is a fight for
German nationality •••• No consideration for
the Polish people must hinder us from doing
all we can to maintain and strengthen German
nationality in the former Polish domains ••••
In the struggle, he says, between nationalities,
one nation is the hammer, and the other is the
anvil; one is the victor, and the other
the vanquished. 24
The Prussian policy of colonizing her Polish provinces with
Germans in systematic fashion produced a different type of immigration
than that prior to the nineteenth century.
Germanization, based on the idea of a German
National state (Deutscher Nationalstaat)
became an official policy in 1876, with the
passage of the language law of that year.
By the law of April 26, 1886, an act "concerning
the furthering of German settlements in the
province of west Prussia and Posen", a fund

23 Hill, 140.

24 Ibid •

•
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of 100 OOO marks was put at the disposal of
the co i onization commission to buy real
estate from Polish owners for the purpose
of settling German peasants and workers.
This fund was increased several times, and by
1914 a sum of 1,055,000 marks had been spent
on the colonization program. The results
were in some respects the opposite of What had
been expected: the colonization program served
to strengthen Polish nation~~ism and the
opposition to German rule.
The German population, many of whom were dependent upon the state
for their livelihood failed in its prime purpose of impressing an
artificial German character upon a Polish land.
"The inescapable conclusion is that conflict is the most important
element in the promotion of nationalism." 26 Nationalism, itself,:i.s

'

a fluid term and in the vicissitudes of history has had many connotations.
,

In an ultimate analysis it denotes a dominant ethnocentrism, a purSUit
of self-interest, whether aggressive or defensive.

It is an element

of grave importance in the understanding of the political and social
problems of Polish history.

25

Segal, 169.
26 Francis J. Brown, Charles Hodges, Joseph S. Roucek, editors.
contemporary World Politics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., N.Y.,

1940, 40.

--
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CHAPTER II
AT THE PEACE OF PARIS
written in blood and tears, the history of Poland weighed heavily
upon the conscience of EUrope.

"At the Peace Conference statesmen

bent over backwards to be helpful.

Wilson had sentimental notions;

Clemenceau thought of a mighty Poland as a check upon Germany.

These

were further played upon by two of the Polish representatives, the
world-renowned Paderewski, and the quixotic war hero Pi1sudski." 27
The work which awaited the framers of the treaty that was to remake the
map of the worldwas as great and as unprecedented as the war which had
just been brought to a close.

However honest an attempt was to be made

to establish real nation-states from which irredentism would be eliminated
and, however meticulously boundary lines were to be drawn, minorities
would inevitably have to remain.

"In the grip of a hysterical national-

ism, harried by pressing economic problems, frightened by the growth
of social radicalism, worn down by years of warfare, Poland was in no
mood to be a sympathetic guardian of the rights of minority peoples."
As the Great War progressed, the empires Which had partitioned
Poland successively collapsed, and it remained for the Allies to redress
the four partitions of 1712-1815 by establishing a national Poland

27 Sachar, 112.
28 Ibid., 114.
17

•
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independent and secure of access to the sea.

But the treaty that was

to accomplish this task was the work of fallible men.

"One of the

chief lessons of the Peace Conference--a lesson enforced by every year
that has followed it--is that experts should not displace statesmen
in the determination of great issues." 29
The Treaty was studied, prepared and discussed
for six long months by fifty-eight technical
commissions on which sat the foremost specialists
of each country which held 1,646 meetings.
The conclusions of these commissions verified
by twenty-six local investigations, were
discussed from January 10 to June 28 by three
bodies: the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs which held thirty-nine meetings;
the Council of Ten which held seventy-two
meetings and the Council of Four Which held
one hundred and forty-five meetings. These
three Councils also gave hearings to the
chairmen of tHe technical commissions, and
all the representatives of Allied or neutral.
countries interested. Finally when at the
beginning of May, the texts were settled
upon, the cabinets of the3~arious Powers were
called into consulation.
The committees, undoubtedly conscientiously applied themselves
to the drafting of their various reports.

The real fallacy of the

treaty lay in the fact "that when the Allied and Associated Powers
shifted over from the task of making the

b~oad

outlines of a preliminary

peace to that of shaping a final treaty, they did not at that time
29
30

Shotwell, James T., At the Paris Peace Conference, N.Y. The Macmillan
Co., 1937, 26.
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proceed to assemble the real Peace Conference, that which would include
both victors and vanquished in the World War." 31
Of all the parts of the Versailles Peace Treaty, there is, perhaps,
none which required greater skill, greater moral courage to make than
the Polish-German settlement.

The rise of Prussia had been accomplished

mainly by the spoliation of Poland.

A genuine restoration of Poland

then, must ultimately result, at least, in the partial downfall of
Prussia.

The great wealth of coal found in Upper Si1esia, ceded to

Poland deprived Prussia of one of her chief sources of revenue.
Could she be blamed for filing protest?

yet the protest was not heeded

and a dangerous issue was ceded to Poland with her inherited wealth
in land.

Dmowski, who had been invited to explain the Polish claim

to territory, made great play with a German map
showing the racial conquests on which their
Colonizing Commission had spent $300,000,000
between 1885 and 1914. Was the Conference to
support such expropriation of the Polish
natives? The Baltic question, he frankly
declared, could not be settled without injury
to one or the other side. Either East Prussia,
an islandof nearly 2,000,000 Germans, must
be cut off from the fatherland, or a like
hurt must be inflicted on the West Prussian
Poles, and in that case all Poland, a people
of 25,000,000 souls, would be dominated by
the Germans. 32
The Poles are a people of intense patriotism which reaches a degree of
almost fanatical fervor and Dmowski in the white heat of it struck
31 Shotwell, 40.
32 Cambridge History of Poland. Edited by W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson,
g~6H,!eCki, R. Dyboski. Cambridge University Press, London, 1941, II,
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every vibrant chord that might apoeal to the Judges who were deciding
his country's fate.
Clemenceau, president of the Peace Conference, had himself a very
simple program:

Germany must be reduced to such a position that she

could never again be a menace to France.

He wanted Germany punished

as though she were a uniquely sinful nation and France a sinless
martyr land.

\
"He wanted Germany so crippled and devastated
as never more to be able to stand up to
France. He wanted to hurt and humiliate
Germany more than Fr ance had been hurt and
humiliated in 1811. He did not care if in
breaking Germany Europe was broken; his mind
did not go far enough beyond the Rhine to
understand that possibility •••• " 33

Privately, Clemenceau condemned only Dmowski's claim to Teschen
(Creszyn), and his attitude was of special importance, since France
predominated in the Commission that was appointed to consider the
Polish frontiers.
Jules Cambon, formerly ambassador in Berlin,
presided, with General Lerond, a geographical
specialist, as Vice-president. Baron
Degrand, the Foreign Office expert on
Poland, Sir William Tyrrell, the Marquis della
Torretta, and the Harvard professor, R. H.
Lord, a master of partit~on histor,y, represented
the Four Great Powers. 34
Lloyd George, the mercurial Welshman, at the head of the British
delegation to the Conference declared:

"that an independent Poland,

33 Achon, Erik, European Civilization and Politics since 1815.
N.Y., Harcourt, Brace and Co.,

34 cambridge, 497.
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comprising all those genuinely Polish elements which desired to form
part of it, was an urgent necessity for the stability of western
Europe."

35 President Wilson wished that the settlement of every

question whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangements,
or of political relationship, to be upon the basis of free acceptance
of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon
the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation
or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its
own exterior influence or mastery. 36
On 31 october 1918, the Americans who were
explaining President Wilson's Fourteen points
to the supreme War council, stated as the
'chief problem' 'whether Poland is to obtain
territory west of the Vistula which would
cut off the Germans of East Prussia from the
Empire, or whether Danzig can be made a
free port and the Vistula internationalized.'
They declared that' on the east, in Poland
should receive no territory in which
Li thuanians or Ukranians predominate. If
Posen and Silesia go to Poland, rigid
protection must be afforded the minorities
of Germans and Jews living there, as well
as in other parts of· the Polish State.' 37
Wilson believed an imperfect peace better than no peace at all; above
all, he believed that the League would eventually right any wrongs
committed by the treaty.
three statesmen.

36

37

Leadership in the Conference lay with these

It is difficult to conceive of three more widely

capek, Thomas Jr., origin of the Czechoslovak state, The Kevell
Press, 1926, 50.
Cambridge, 490.
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different natures than those of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson,
yet upon their united decision the fate of Europe ultimately depended.
When the Committee delegated to examine the question of the
Polish frontiers submitted its reports to the Supreme Council of the
Peace Conference it unanimously recommended the concession of tne
greater part of what Dmowski had claimed.
Danzig and the railway thence to Warsaw
by way of Mlawa they would assign to Poland,
whose 'economic necessity', they held, should
override the wishes of a predominantly
German population. In that region and in
Upper Silesia they awarded her the districts
with a Polish majority, except for Protestant
Allenstein, where a plebescite should be
held, and Teschen, which, for economic reasons,
should fall to Czechoslovakia. 38
The Supreme Council, however, upon hearing the report was divided
in its opinion.

The French still believed German ambition was

inveterate and tney wished her to be as small and weak as possible,
while they looked on Poland as a future ally against her.
wno reverenced nationality, favored the Polish claims.

Wilson,

His trust in

the League of Nations supported his decision.
Lloyd George, however, seeing Germany
prostrate and France omnipotent, declined to
make this temporary situation the basis of
a new and suspect power. He declared himself
'strongly adverse to transferring more
Germans from German rule to the rule of some
other nation than can possibly be helped.' ••••

38 Ibid., 501,2.
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To 'place 2,100,000 Germans', he said,
'-under the control of a people which is of
a different religion and which has never
proved its capacity for stable self-government
throughout its history must ••• lead sooner
39
or later to a new war in tne East of Europe'.
The Germans hotly denounced tne alienation of a great part of
a predominantly German province.

Poland,

connection with Silesia since 1163.

t~ey

maintained, had no

It owed everything to Germany,

and, as for a sign of Polish nationality tnere, they denied its
existence declaring that even the language was but a Polish dialect.
On June 16, having drawn up a plan for the
voting, the Allies replied to the German
Observations. They announced that, althougn
in the district to be ceded the majority was
indisputably Polish, they had decided to
hold a plebiscite in lieu of immediate
transference to poland. The restoration
of the Polish state, they said, was a great
historical act which must break many ties.
But they were providing for the protection
of the transferred Germans, as well as of
all other minorities, religious; racial,
or linguistic.' 40
The Jews were prominent at the Peace conference and were the most
persistent advocates of minority rights.

Among their demands they

agitated for civil and political equality everywhere and special
minority rights for the Jews in the new states to be established, viz.,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and in
the enlarged states of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

39 Ibid., 501,2.

40 Ibid., 505.
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The Paris Conference was disposed, in general, to give more
weight to the principle of nationality, than to economic or strategic
considerations.

Yet it was an utter impossibility to create frontiers

that did not cut off some people from what should have been their
home-state.

The Allied powers were anxious to protect these minorities

and they, therefore, insisted upon special guarantees which became
part of the peace treaties.

poland was pledged to respect the

legitimate aspirations of her minority groups, to grant them full
political and civil equality, and to permit them to maintain their
cultural identity through their own schools and the development of
their own language.

At first, Poland rebelled against such restrictions

looking upon them as humiliating and likely to jeopardize national
sovereignty and interfere with internal concerns but it was the price
of her new nationa.l boundaries and she had to accept the tenus.
TIle Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28,
1919, and effective on January 10, 1920, was
the keynote of the so-ca.lled Versailles system.
Its declared purpose was to establish, preserve
and secure peace. In this respect, it did
not differ greatly from past peace treaties
which had repeatedly attempted to establish
perpetual and enduring peace •••• Tnere were,
however, three interrelated elements which
radically distingui&~ed Versailles from
previous systems •••• These elements were (a)
who established the peace; (b) the assumptions
on-which it rested; and (c) the methods by
which it was to be rendered secure. 41

41
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Although the Great Powers were signatory Parties to the Minorities
Treaties, they actually could not exercise anJ> direct role in their
enforcement because they delegated that function to the League of
Nations.

Instead of disposing of their disputes through political

bargaining among the powers, as they had done before, the signatories
of the Minorities treaties agreed to submit them to an international
body.
But the new 5,Ystem of guarantees for minorities
did not include all European cOuntries and it
lacked any real method of enforcement. For
the League can act in a matter concerning
a minority only if a member of the Council
of the League brings to the Counci11s attention
a-vIoIation or danger ~vioTatlon of the
IDinori ties provisions.
--..;:::,:::,: -- - "Self-determination", a phrase that became an important issue of tne
paris conference was protected by the Minorities treaties and, in
spite of its deficiencies, the League became the guardian of the
national aspirations of dominated peoples.
The question of Minorities is but a new form of the old problem
of nationalities, a problem "that has existed from the earliest history
of mankind.

Every primitive tribe had its intricate customs governing

the treatment of the stranger.

These customs continued long after the

tribe had become part of a larger unit and were found in the laws of the
slowly emerging nation-states. 11 43

42 Dyboski, Roman, Outlines of Polish Histo~ London, George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1925, 66.
-~,
43 International Conciliation. Documents for the Year 1926 The
Problems of Minorities, Sept. 1926, No. 222.
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Tod~

the major problem is not only how to protect the minorities,

but also to protect the majorities against their own minorities.

A

resolution from the Third Assembly of the League of Nations, recognizing
this as one of its serious problems, makes the following statement:
"While the ASSEmbly recognizes the primar,f right of the minorities to be
protected by the League from oppression, it also emphasizes the duty
incumbent upon persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic
minorities to cooperate as loyal fellow citizens with the nations to
whicn t11ey now belong."

44 The members of the Peace Conference nad noped

that by offering the minorities assured protection from the very beginning
that they might be the more easily reconciled to their new positions.
the rights of minorities are not based upon
a contract between the state in question and
its minority citizens, but are based upon a
contact between the state in question and the
League of Nations, thereby making them really
effective. The importance of this lies in
the fact that the protection of minorities
is brought 1.Ulder the League's judicial and
political system. The right of complaint, of
intervention, of demanding redress in c~se
of violation of the rights of minorities lies
juridically with the League of Nations.
Assumirig the moral authority of the League of
Nations, and assuming its politically effective
authority whi~~ is constantly increasing,
minorities exposed to the possibility of
oppression and those who are the beneficiaries
of protective clauses in treaties have here
a guarantee which cannot be too highly estimated.

44

Brown,

48.
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The existence of national minon ties is not caused by a defective
tracing of frontiers.

In Europe it is impossible to form states comprising

only peoples of the same race and language.
No tracing of frontiers could suppress the
existence of national minorities and assure the
national homogeneity of the peoples of each
state. The achievement of such homogeneity
would be a physical impossibility without first
effecting a transfer of such large masses of
the population as to make the proposition
absurd and the reason for this is that the
territories and regions where national minorities
exist are precisely those where the population
is most mixed frQm a racial and linguistic
point of view. 46
Frontiers can not be based on the principle of national factors, alone,
for applied in an absolute form they would establish frontiers which would
destroy the effectiveness of

th~

state they delimit.

The Minorities

treaties have been criticized on the ground that they tend to create a
state within a state, which will ultimately lead to national disintegration
but there is no clause preventing the voluntary merging of minorities and
majorities, they merely prevent assimilation by force.

Some means, too,

of preventing infraction of minority rights had to be deVised; thus the
intervention of an outside authority for the redress of real or
grievances was not entirely out of place.

imagina~

As had already been shown,

the League made it its business to point out the necessity of a benevolent
feeling of good-will between the minorities

an~

their states while at

the same time endeavoring to safeguard the interests of both.

46 Azcarte, 6,7.
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Finally, the Minorities treaties have been
attacked on the ground that their provisions
are inadequate and that they have not been
enforced. The violation of these treaties has
been inevitable in view of the fierce nationalistic
hatreds engendered during the war •••• Nevertheless,
the existence of these treaties gives minorities
a peaceful means of airing their grievances
before the public opinion of the world. While
reparation may not always be made, these treaties,
imperfectly enforced, are better than no treaties
at all. 47
Poland, on her part, gave elaborate securities for good behaviour,
and some of the fundamental laws contained in the treaty were never altered
by the Poles.

Complete protection of life and liberty was promised, and

right to such public and private worship as was consistent with public
order and morals was granted to every inhabitant of the state.

Polish

citizenship could be claimed by all previous residents in her territory
regardless of their former nationality, or they were free to adopt another
within a year.

All Polish nationals were equal before the law and any

language might be employed in the press, at public meetings, and before
the law by Polish nationals of non-Polish speech.

Detailed

p~Visions

on the educational facilities to be provided for Polish citizens who
belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities were incorporated
in the Treaty.

Articles eight and nine deal with the general problem,

while Article ten contains a special provision concerning the administration
of the Jewish schools.

47

The text of the provisions reads as follows:

International conciliation.

Documents for the Year 1926.
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Article 8: Polish nationals who belong to
racial, religious, or linguistic minorities
shall enjoy in law and in fact the same treatment
and security as the Polish nationals. In
particular, they shall have an equal right to
establish, manage, and control at their own
expense charitable, religious and social
institutions, schools, and other educational
establishments, with the rigJ:lt to use their
own language and to exercise their religion
freely therein.
Article 9: Poland will provide in the public
educational syste.11l in towns and districts
in which a considerable proportion of Polish
nationals of other than Polish speech are
residents, adequate facilities for insuring that
in the primary schools instruction shall be
given to the children of such Polish nationals
through the medium of their own language. This
provision shall not prevent the Polish government from making obligatory the teaching of
the Polish language in the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a
considerable proportion of Polish nationals
belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic
minorities, these minorities shall be assured
an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided but
of public funds under the state, municipal, or
other budgets, for educational, religious or
charitable purposes.
Article 10: Educational committees appointed
locally by the Jewish communities of Poland, will,
subi8Ct to the general control of the state,
provide for the distribution of the proportional
share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools
in accordance wi th Article 9, and for the
organization and management of these schools.
The proviSion of Article 9 concerning the
use of language in the schools shall apply
to these schools. 48

48 Segal, 189, 190.

•
30
Jews were not to be compelled to Violate their sabbatll even in order
to attend a law-court, while Poland agreed not to hold registrations or
elections on Saturdays.
It was almost ineVitable that great masses of their fellow-citizens
would certainly hate the Poles.

'!he League of Nations might, perhaps,

be able to protect the new nation from foreign foes, but internal mismanagement might render Poland BolsheVist.

It was not unreasonable,

therefore, to make its protection conditional on a

~ufficient

guarantee

of moderation towards those races which the new commonwealth would
incorporate against their will.

CHAPTER ITI
AFTER THE PEACE

The principle of Nationalism popularized under tne term, selfdetermination, was the touchstone upon which the Great Powers, who
drew up the program of peace at the end of World
their final decisions.

war I, meant to rest

Yet,

What happened at Paris was but a Single
act in a much larger drama, one which stretches
back to the Middle Ages and reaches forward
through the era of science and mobilized
industry to envisage new and untried forms
of political and economic relationships within
and among nations. The Peace Treaties had to
deal with facts for which they were not responsible, but which, because registered in them,
are thought of as their handiwork. For example,
the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy took place
months before the Treaties of st. Germain and
Trianon were signed, and the documents in
which the new sovereignties were recognized
embodied, however blunderingly, the inescapable
facts of war and revolution. It was impossible
to draw this new map of Europe without doing
injury to the vested interests of former
governments and peoples. But it was also inevitable
that the dispossessed would exploit the injury
as a political slogan and a diplomatic weapon
for years to come. 49
The victors, on the other hand, would be forced to mount close guard over
lands whose borders had become as President Wilson put it:
of freedom".

49 Shotwell, 49.
31
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It is evident that the Peace Conference went beyond the nineteenthcentury precedent which had prescribed equality of treatment to all
individuals, irrespective of religious affiliation, for the Minorities
Treaties gave legal sanction to the perpetuation of the linguistic and
cultural differences between the Minorities and Majorities of the states
affected.

Though the more ambitious hopes of the far-eastern Jews were

not realized, still the Jews everywhere acclaimed the Minorities Treaties
as a great victory.
The general attitude of the Jews toward
the treaty stipulation was well presented in
a letter which Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler and
Nahum Sokolow sent to Boris Bogen, the administrator of Jewish relief in Poland. They wrote:
Its (the Polish Treaty's) clauses are
far-reaching. It confers complete civil and
political rights upon all Jews of Poland,
regardless of race, language, nationality, or
religion. It carefully defines citizenship.
It prevents discrimination. It adequately
protects the life and liberty' of all the inhabitants. It affords aaple security for the free
exercise of religion, assures equality before
the law, and free use of the languages of the
several minorities and the right of management
by them of their schools and other communal
institutions with that of sharing in the public
funds appropriated for educational and other
like purposes.
These rights of Minorities are declared
by the treaty to be matters of international
concern •••• This is an act of the first magnitude.
In truth it constitutes a genuine charter of
liberty for all minorities because its effectiveness is guaranteed by the sanction of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. 50

50 Janowsky, Oscar I., The Jews and Minority Rights. N.Y. columbia
,University press, 19jJ,' j89. -
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The disabilities from which the Jews of Eastern Europe had long
suffered seemed at end.

The Jews of Poland were urged to forget the

past and in the dawning of this new era to content themselves with what
had been achieved and take the initiative in establishing cordial relations
with their non-Jewish fellow citizens.
Poland, owing her existence to the military
and financial aid of the Allies, and tacitly
promised their continued support, finally,
agreed to abide honourably by the treaty
provisions. They were set down clearly, in no
uncertain tems, so that it lIOuld not be possible
to seize upon ambiguities to whittle them
away.
All the guarantees, however, proved
ineffective. Almost from the beginning Poland
engaged in a policy of repression, applying to
her minority groups the galling disCrimination
which she herself had suffered for centuries. 51

--

In order to understand Poland's policy of persecution it is important
to remember the problems which. she faced as she emerged from the blood
bath of war.
Her territories were a union of provinces which
for a hundred and fifty years had been under
tnree foreign powers. Hence there was a tremendous task of assimilation even among the
Poles, for they had been transformed by many
diverse traditiolls under Russian, German, and
Austrian control. The west was industrial,
highly developed; the East was agricultural,
backward, illiterate. The frontiers of the
country had no natural defences and yet they
were threate~ed by enemies on all sides,
especially by Russia and Germany. 52

51 Sachar, 172,3.
52 ~., 173.
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A large share of the political misfortune of Poland has been due
to the factional differences among the people themselves.

Years of

dismemberment have taught reunited poland the necessity and value of
cohesion; thus reunion of the country in spirit a'ld culture has become
the goal of the ambitious Poles.

It is not an easy task to eradicate such

marks as those imprinted upon each of the different sections of Poland
during her years of subjection to foreign governments, and it is their
fear that the Jews will oppose the fulfillment of this intense desire
for unification that has led the Pole to continue in his hatred for the
Jew.

"Hatred is essentially based on fear, and it is fear that the

Jews will thwart them in their national ambition that has brought forth
the enmity of the Poles to as great a degree as their hatred for

th~

Germans and the Russians.,,53
The Jews form one of the largest of Poland's Minorities.

'!hey are .

scattered all over the country, numbering about three million, but to a
I

considerable extent they are concentrated mainly in the cities and are
engaged in trade.

With the rise of a Polish middle class after the war,

the Jews no longer were needed to fill a void in Polish economic life.
Indeed, in order to encourage economic activities among the majority
population, organized boycotts against the Jews were effected.

53
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In view of this economic stratification of
the Jewish population, laws and administrative
measures could easily be enacted which, while
couched in general terms and ostensibly applying
equally to all, were in effect directed mainly
against the Jews. Tax laws were so conceived
as to impose the greatest burden on the cities,
and consequently upon the urban Jews. The
cities of Eastern Europe paid most of the
taxes, though the nations of that region were
predominantly agricultural.
In the guise of general laws, which to
all appearances applied equal.ly to all citizens,
Eastern Europe succeeded in depriving the
Jews of their economic positions. 54
Until the mid-nineteenth century the Jews had pursued their way,
unopposed, in the middle class occupations of Poland.

Large settlements

of Jewish population could be found in all the cities where, because
the Pole shied clear of trade and commerce, the Jew dwelt in economic
securi~.

With the rise of Polish nationalism came the question:

Why not a purely Polish middle class?

The establishment of an independent

Poland served to accelerate such an ideological movement.

Moreover,

after the war, it became necessary to completely transform Polish economy.
The markets of poland were cut away by
the sudden separation from Russia and by the
high tariff waJls of Germany, Austria, and the
Baltic states. Agricultural prices declined
and the peasants, burdened too heavily already
by taxes to support the military colossus,
faced ruin. Before the war the textiles of
poland, its shoes and leather goods and gloves,
were shipped by the millions of dozens into
Russia and the lively trade kept the mills
of Lodz, Bialystok, and other industrial centers,
humming. But Bolshevik Russia no longer traded
with poland. The textiles languished and the
mills stood idle. The destruction of city

54
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purchasing power adversely affected agricultural
prices further, and they collapsed altogether.
The sons of the starving peasants began
to move in droves out of the villages, seeking
to establish themselves in middle-class occupations and in the professions, in the towns and
cities. But here the Jews had developed a
high degree of efficiency, and it was difficult
to compete with them. Conflict was inevitable.
One Polish Senator later put the whole case
frankly in terms of sociological law: I If
the aboriginal nation reaches economic maturity,
the immigrant nation must step aside. I Poles
now desperately needed the economic pOSitions
which were held by the Jews who had played out
their roles and were no longer indispensable.
They IDU§t go, if not voluntarily, then by
force. ~5
The position formerly held by the Jews had only been justifiable, argued
the Pole, when Poland had existed as a feudal domain.

The suffering now

produced by an economic depression served to intensify this feeling of
hostility.
eve~

Jewish persecution was an economic necessity in the eyes of

patriotic Pole.

In a radio speech presented on February 21, 1937 Colonel Adam Koc
addressed the country in the following terms:
Our attitude toward the Jewish population is
as follows: we value too highly the standard
of our cultural life, as well as order and tranquili ty, without which no state can exist, to
approve arbitrary and brutal anti-Jewish acts,
which are a blow to the honor and dignity of a
great nation. One can, however, understand the
instinct of cultural self-defense, and consider
as natural the trend of the Polisn people
toward economic independence. This is even
.easier to understand in a time like ours,

55 sachar, 181.
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of economic and financial unrest, when only a
profound public consciousness, a readiness of
sacrifice and an uncompromised binding of one's
life and fortune with the state, can make it
possible for theSt§~e to emerge from this
unrest unimpaired. 5
Economic boycotts were applied by large sections of the public
aga:iJlst Jewish enterprises.
could be forced to emigrate.

It was hoped that by such means the Jew
Several Polish Societies issued early in

nineteen hundred thirty-eight the follow:iJlg proclamation:
The simplest and most effective way of fighting
the Jewish flood is the slogan: 'A Pole supports
a Pole.' Depri v:ing the Jews of earning money
means that they will be forced to leave Poland.
This is the only radical solution of the Jewish
question. Wi th the utmost forcefulness and
with the deepest conviction of the necessity
of self-defence, we urge all Christians not
to sell to Jews any land or houses, nor to buy
from Jewish stores, nor to employ Jewish lawyers,
physicians, engineers, architects, artists, or
any other professional men. 57
In the meantime Government leaders explored every possible avenue to
facilitate Jewish emigration from poland.
They approached the American diplomatic corps.
They made representations to Britain not to
lower the Jewish quota for palestine. They
appealed to the League of Nations to convene
an international conference to oonli~@~ migration
outlets. When the rumour leaked out that Madagascar
might become a possible heaven for refugees,
Polish officials at once approached France to
offer co-operation. The Jews had no warmer
champions in international councils so long as the
conversation turned to their migration from poland!

56 Segal, 70.
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Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister, explained
glibly that the anti-Semitism of his country
was really the product of tremendous economic
pressure. If this could only be relieved by
Jewish evacuation, it would disappear. 58
But there were no opportunities for large-scale emigration and the more
realistic Polish leaders recognized the futility of relying upon any such
mass evacuation.

The economic persecution continued and the Jews lived

in a state of perpetual unrest.
Day and night they are 'controlled', their
houses are'searched', and whatever in the
opinion of the searchers constitutes a
'superabundance of possessions' is taken without
any furtiler ado. Although the Government has
forbidden patrolling during the hours of the
night, this sort of patrolling is continued
without any official interference. Ever.y
day the Jewish Committee of Succor hears of
new cases of murder and robbery and arson. 59
Cries of:

"Don't buy from the Jews 1 Have nothing to do with the Jews lit

were heard on all sides while the reactionar.y press took up specific points
towards making the boycott complete.
Through its highly developed intelligence
service it furnishes lists of Jewish enterprises
in various 10 c ali ties: 'Thirty-six Jews are
making a living here--they are depriving thirtysix patriotic Poles of a livelihood! ••• Poles
buying from Jews are photographed, identified,
and their names published on the roll of dishonor
in the local press. Peasants who 'sell their
produce to Jews are beaten. The Polish artisan
is urged to mark his goods with a special brand
'so that no patriot may innocently buy Jewishmade goods. T'ae Government, with 'national
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interests' in mind sets up licensing and
educational tests for artisans and merchants;
and the examiners, of course, are Polish gompetitors in the same fields ot activity. 60
A program of elimination had its effect ll,pon the Jew, a process of
steauy decline settled upon him, from large-scale trade to middle-scale
trade, from middle-scale trade to petty trade) from petty trade to street
peddling, whence the threshold of beggary was forced upon him.

Such

became the lot of the average Jew in Poland.
Among the Jews, themselves, there was a division of opinion as to
what was the best course to pursue.

Some bel:ieved that their only hope

lay in emphasis on the fact that they were Je'\'rs and in developing a true
love for Jewish ideals.
They wanted separate schools tor their children
and also the right to manage t~eir own charities
and other institutions. They believed that
Judaism was a question not onl~ of religion,
but also of race. They were anxious to preserve
their racial culture, which co1tl.d only be done
if the children were taught in Jewish schools. 61
The Assimilators, on the other hand, were those Jews who believed
that Judaism was only a question of religion.

They wished to become

entirely Polonized and felt that the establisQment of separate Jewish
institutions would only deepen the already eXisting line of demarcation.
They felt that a Jew whose family had lived in Poland for hundreds of years
could be as good a Polish citizen as a man of Polish race.
of being treated as servants."

They said.

"We are tired

"A.t the present moment we

&:J Article: "J ews in poland: to Get Out Seellts the only Answer but Where
Can They O<>?" A. G. Duker. Current HiStory: 45: Dec., 1936, 66.
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are suffering from nationalist intolerance, but if We can only keep on
fighting for justice we shall win through just as we did against religious
persecut ~on •••• II 62
o

Before either party could prove the worth of its ideals, Nazism
spread to Poland and it was Hitler who decided the fate of Jews and
Poles, alike, in the years that were to follow and once more Poland was
swallowed up by an avaricious neighbor.

*

*

*

In maqy respects the Polish Germans
were better off than any other minority group
in Poland. Although tue German representatives
made repeated complaints to the League of Nations
about the use of agrarian reforms as a means
of depriving the German land-owners of their
possessions, the fact remained that the Germanowned part of cul ti vated land had a much higher
yield per hectare than the average Polish farms.
Furthermore, taeir social and occupational
structure was better balanced than that of the
Poles or that of other na tional minorities. 63
Politically, too, they had a more favourable position and the German
Government at home did all she could to help her national abroad.

Germany,

alone, of the three former rulers of Poland had succeeded in establishing
an important portion of nationals on Polish territory.

The very power

of the Germans in German Poland incurred Polish resentment against them
and Polish nationalism became stronger there than elsewhere as a consequence.

62 Ibid., 6l.
63 Schmitt, 162,3.

According to the Germans:
The separation of the 'Corridor' and of Danzig
from Prussia, and from the Reich, took place
in 1919 against the will of large parts of the
population, particularly in Danzig, and has
produced an intolerable situation and a change
in the map of Europe which appea~s absurd. 64
The German language is spoten here and numerous economic, intellectual,
and spiritual bonds link the people with the rest of Gennany.

yet

a large number of these Germans have, so to
speak, no right to be there. Everyone knows
with what infinite patience, vast expenditure
of money and effort, and perfect indifference
to justice or morali ty, the Prussian government
has worked to fill its eastern provinces with
Germans and to dispossess the poles of a land
which has been theirs for a thousand years.
The chef d'oeuvre of ~~e policy has been the
work of the Imperial Colonization Commission
which in the last thirty years has spent over
500,000,000 marks in buying up property in the
eastern provinces and settling German colonists
upon it. Over 100,000 Germans have been brought
in in this way. Half a dozen other official and
semi-official organizations have been at work
for the same purpose. In addition, the host
of government functionaries, and servants
in these provinces, the administrative, judicial,
financial, railroad, telegraph, postal, forest,
school officials and employees, have been recruited
almost exclusively from the Germans, and very
largely from Germans brought in from the west
by the promise of higher pay· and other special
privileges. 65
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The minority in the "Corridor" according to the Polish inhabitants
scarcely count as loyal subjects with whom cordial relations can be
contemplated.

A policy of reconciliation argues little hope of success

against such antagonism.
In order to alleviate some of these difficulties Germany and Poland
signed the Geneva Convention in May, 1922.

A mixed Commission and an

Arbi tral Tribunal was established which settled many disputes connected
with the minority schools, employment conditions, and general relations
between the Poles and the Gemans.

Bitterness, however, still reigned

on botn sides of the German-Polish frontier.
Nationalism is ramp an t. The Germans have
made little attempt to understand the Poles,
and innumerable Germans despise the Poles as
members of a lower race. Even liberal opinion
in Germany after the war predicted without
regret the early disintegration of the resurrected
state. Such an attitude changed gradually
among many groups of Gemans Who realized the
justification of the Polish Republic, though
nationalistic circles continued to look down
on the Poles. As a result, Germany's just
claims in the eyes of the neutral world have
been injured, while Poland's true strength
has been misinterpreted. Imperialistic demands
in 1919 and repressive measures against the
German minority since then have necessari~5
affected German sentiment toward Poland.
The issue between Germany and poland is not only the problem of the
Corridor, the strip of land which separates East Prussia from the Reich,
but to this must be added the plight of Danzig and Upper Silesia, as well

66 stone, 216.
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as the irritations arising from the treatment of the Minorities in both
poland and Germany.
The entire dispute is only another phase of
the tnousand year struggle between Teuton and
Slav for the possession of the territor,y
between the Oder and the Vistula, especially
the land west of the Vistula--the present
Polish province of Pomorze. The district has
no great economic value in itself, but it provides
Poland with an outlet to the sea and Germany
with land that is essential. to her territorial
unity. 67
In August 1939 Hitler demanded the immediate return of the Free City,
threatening war as an alternative.
But Poland refused to permit Danzig to be
returned, for she believed that Germany would
use it as the spearnead of a drive to cut off
the Corridor. In fact, Germany had already
made her ultimate intentions clear by demanding
the cession of a strip of territory across the
Polish corridor to connect East Prussia to th'e
main body 'of the Reich. If she were allowed
to have Danzig, the Poles claimed she would soon
also have this strip, and Poland would be a
land-locked country like rtungary. For this
reason the Poles prepared to fight the minute
Germany attempted to occupy the Free City. To
them the defense of their corridor to the 68
sea was the defense of their independence.
Realizing this danger, both France and Great Britain promised to come
to Poland l s aid should Germany take steps which Poland believed woUld
threaten her independence.

Germany took such a step on the morning of

September 1, 1939, and the result was the Second World War.

67 Ibid., 272, 273.
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CHAPTER IV
ACTION OF THE LEAGUE
The international protection of minorities found in the Versailles
system at the close of the First World War was not a new creation.

For

more than two hundred years, from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the
Treaty of Berlin in 1878, special minorities provisions had been known.
Three innovations, however, characterized this new system, "first, the
unprecedented geographical scope of the protection; second, the objects
of the protection; and, third, the permanent and collective character
of the enforcement of the minorities treaties." 69

These treaties them-

selves stated that the obligations which they laid down were to be secured
by the guarantee of the League of Nations.
formally came into being.

In January, 1920 the League

In the twenty years that the League existed,

Poland became the best client in the sphere of minority questions.
Though the Council of the League and its administrative organ, the
Minorities Section of the Secretariat,

d~voted

more of their time and

efforts to Polish minority questions, than to those of any other country,
It is a somewhat bitter reflection that in
Poland could be seen one of the most typical
examples of the failure of the League to
prevent the German Government from constantly
poisoning the atmosphere in which questions
concerning a German minority were discussed,
and to persuade the government of the country

69 Robinson, ),4.
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containing that minority that the most effective
way of counteracting German activities was to
fulfill its obligations generously and to work
continuously for the cultural and economic
benefit of the minority population. 70 .
About one million Germans left Poland following the establishment of
the new Republic and complaints were made to the League of Nations in the
form of German minority petitions, that official measures of the Polish
r~vernment

were responsible for the departure of more than 400,000 of them.

Some of the best known records of the World Court have dealt with different
aspects bearing on this problem.
German

~ace

Questions relating to settlers of the

and that of the acquisition of Polish nationality occupied

the attention of the League of Nations for years.

They were first brought

before the League by a petition dated November 8th, 1921.
The 'Deutschtumsbund' (a German association
to safeguard the rights of German minorities
in Poland) sent the Secretary General of the
League of Nations a telegram informing him
that several thousand families of farmers of
German origin had been called upon by the
Polish Government to leave their farms before
December 1st., 1921.
In accordance with the procedure prescribed
for urgent cases, the telegram was communicated
both to the Members of the Council of the
League and also to the Polish representative,
and the latter announced that the period of
grace had been extended beyond December 1st.,
and that the Polish Government, for humanitarian
reasons, and decided that, whatever terms
of expulsion might be fixed by the competent
tribunals, these expulSions would only be
carried out progressively and in no case before
May 1st., 1922.
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On several occasions subsequently the
Polish Government, at the request of the
Council, agreed to postpone administrative or
judicial measures which might have prejudicially
affected the normal position of the settlers
referred to in the petition. 71

Persons of the German race, in virtue of a Prussian law of 1886,
and of subsequent legislation had settled in territories which in 1919,
under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, became part of the Polish Republic.
Some of the settlers had concluded contracts (Rentengutsvertrag) with
the Prussian Government entitling them to the property in perpetuity in
return for a fixed annual payment, while others were granted a
"Pachtvertrag rt , or lease, granted for a certain number of years.
In the Treaty of Versailles there is
an article which lays down that the Powers to
which German territory is ceded shall acquire
all property and possessions situated therein
belonging to the German Empire, and that the
value of such acquisitions shall be credited
to the German Government. Under the terms of
this article such property is deemed to include
interalia all the property of the German Crown,
Empire and States. A Polish law was passed on
July 14th., 1920, whereby the name of the
Polish State was automatically substituted in
the land registers for those of the legal
persons referred to above, among others, if
the entry in the register was made later than
November 11th., 1918. Any mortgage or real
right registered on behalf of any of these
persons since that date was regarded as cancelled
in favor of the Polish State.
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The Polish Government considered itself
entitled by these provisions simply to expel
settlers who had not become Polish nationals,
if it regarded their titles as invalid from
its own point of view, that is to say those
whose Rentengusvertrag (contract) although
cond1uded before November 11th., 1918, had not
been followed by an Auflassung (conveyance),
a formality which was essential to complete
the title to property, and also those settlers
whose Pachivertrag (lease) though concluded
before that date, had not been converted into
a Rentengutsvertrag after that date. 72
After much consideration of the question the Council of the League
of Nations finally decided, in accordance with the view of a Committee
composed of the representatives of Brazil, the British Empire and Italy
t.hat the
question of the settlers of German race in
Poland should be regulated on the basis of
the advisory opinion given by the Court, with
which the Council concurred; but as it appeared
impossible for practical reasons to reestablish
in their properties the settlers who had
already been expelled, the Council considered
that these settlers 'should receive from the
Polish Government fair compensation for the
losses which they had suffered as a result
of the fact that they had not been left in
undisturbed possession of their lands. It
hoped that the Polish Government would be
willing to formulate proposals on these
bases. Negotiations were carried on between
the Polish Government and the Council Committee
during March, April, and May 1924.
Lastly, on June 17th., the Council
took note of an agreement between the Polish
Government and the Committee of the Council,
by which the Polish Government would pay a
1~ sum as compensation to the German
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settlers. The agreement provided that compensation amounting in all to 2,700,000 zlotys
(gold francs) should be divided among 500
settlers who could show that they were of
Polish nationality. It was to be increased
if the number of settlers were more than 20
above the figure fixed (500), and reduced
if their number did not exceed 400. Further
the Apportionment of the sum set aside for
cO:t!1Pensation was to be carried out by an agent
in the confidence of the Polish Government
73
and in agreement with the settlers concerned.
Among the articles of the Minorities Treaties several dealt with
the problem of nationality, a problem that was to offer the League a
pertinent field of activity.
Article 3 has reference to former German,
Austrian, Hungarian and Russian nationals,
habitually resident at the date of the coming
into force of the treaty in territory which is
or may be recognized as forming part of Poland,
and admits such persons to be Polish nationals
ipso facto •••• The Article then gives power
to the persons above referred to who were over
eighteen years of age to opt out of Polish
nationality. 74

But
The question with which the Council had to
deal in connection with the petition of the
Deutschumsbund included the interpretation
of Article 4 of the Polish Minorities Treaty.
This article lays down that:
'Poland admits and declares to be Polish
nationals ipso facto and without the requirement of any formality persons of German,
Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality
who were born in the said territory of parents
habitually resident there, even if at the date
of the coming into force of the present Treaty
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they are not themselves habitually resident
there. '
The Polish Government considered itself
entitled under this article to refuse to
recognize as Polish nationals persons Who
were formerly German subjects if their parents
were not habitually resident in territory
which is now part. of Poland both on the date
Qf birth of the person concerned and on the .
date of the entry into force of the Minorities
treaty, namely January 10th, 1920. It regarded
them as still possessing German nationality
and consequently applied to them the treatment
laid down for persons of non-Polish nationality,
and refused them the right to benefitr-by the
guarantees accorded by that Treaty. 7~
The question was reffered to the League but the Polish Government
being of the opinion that Article 4 of the Minorities Treaty was not
one of those which was placed under the guarantee of the League of
Nations, would not give its approval to any interpretation of the
article rendered by the League.

Negotiations between the German and

Polish Governments were then initiated but, as there seemed to be no
hope of settling the question under this arrangement, an appeal was
made to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The Court gave

its opinion on September 15th., 1923.
It concluded that the League of Nations was
competent and that under the terms of Article
4 it would be sufficient if the parents were
habitually resident in the ceded territory
at the date of birth of the persons concerned.
On September 25th., 1923, the Council
adopted the Court's opinion and invited its
rapporteur to offer his good offices to the
Polish government in conSidering how to
apply the provisions of the Treaty, and for

75

e of Nations and

~

Protection of Minorities

~

Race,

50
negotiation if necessary with the German
Government (1) at Geneva in regard to Articles
3 and 4 of the Minorities Treaty, and (2),
at any other place in regard to questions
connected therewith. In the 14th. of the
same month the Council approved the Polish
Government's programme.
The Geneva negotiations opened on
February 12th., 1924, under the presidency
of the Brazilian representative on the Council.
As the other negotiations had led to no result,
the Council, on March 14th., 1924 passed a
resolution requesting the German and Polish
Governments to continue their negotiations
on all the questions at issue under the
presidency of a third person who should act
as mediator. If no settlement were reached
by July 1st., 1924, this third person should
have full power to arbitrate. The Council
added that the President of the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal of Upper Silesia might undertake
this duty.
The Council's resolution was approved
by both parties, and negotiations were accordingly opened on April 28th, 1924 at Vienna.
Th~ continued beyond the period prescribed
so that, although the period was extended
by some weeks, the arbitral procedure came
into operation; and they finally terminated
on August 30th., with the Signing of a
Protocol whereby both parties were satisfied
on the agreement reached which was ratified at
Warsaw on February 10th., 1925. At its thirtyfourth session the Council took note (June
8th., 1925) of the exchange of ratifications
and approved the clauses of the Concention
in so far as they concerned the League of
Nations in virtue of the Minorities Treaty. 76
Another opportunity to test its ability came to the League from
Upper Silesia where conflict between the Poles and the Germans was rife
in the years that followed the war.
76
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to Poland only a small part of Prussian Silesia, and had provided for
a plebiscite in Upper Silesia.

All the residents of the province over

twenty years of age were given the right to choose between the rule of
Poland or Germany.

The final decision on the frontiers was to be based

largely upon the vote of the people.

The plebescite was fixed for the

twentieth of March, 1921, but gave no clear result.
In a large part of Silesia, Poland gained

a great majority of the Communes, but larger
towns, German islands in the midst of Polish
territory, which had only come into being in
the nineteenth century, voted German. In
all 678 communes voted for Poland as against
844 for Germany, While of the individual votes
Germany obtained 701,000, Poland 419,000.
In the eastern districts, which are economically
the most important, being rich in coal and
factories, the Poles secured a numerical
preponderance, thougQ this was not everywhere sufficiently great; on the other hand
the western districts, Which are agricultural
and ethnographiCal1 Polish voted in great
part for Germany. 7

7

Germany immediately began to claim the whole of Silesia, while Poland
under the leadership of Korfanty demanded the regions where the Poles had
had the majority of votes.
The 'Korfanty line' included the Whole of
the industrial portion and a small part of
the agricultural one, viz, the land as far
as the Oder River above Kosel, then along a
line running northeast, west of Strzelec and
east of 01esna. In that district 420,000
individual constituents and 560 communes· had
voted for Poland as against 400~OOO constituents
and 150 communes for Germany. 7
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The dispute between the two nations developed into open conflict and
it was only through pressure from the outside that a cessation of hostilities was effected.

It was finally agreed to submit the question to

the Council of the League of Nations, whose findings were to be unreservedly accepted.
The League Council, having had the matter
examined by a Commission of representatives
of disinterested states, gave its verdict on
12 October, 1921. The frontier between Poland
and Germany was so fixed that Poland received
the whole districts of Psyczyna, Katowice
(urban and rural), Krolewska, Hut a , almost
the whole of the district of Rybnik, the part
of the district of Raciborz (Ratibor) which
lies on the right bank of the Oder, the greatest
part of the districts of Tarnowskie Gory and
Lubliniec, and fragments of the districts
of Zabrze, Benthen and Gkuivitz, without,
however, those three towns. This area
comprised about )000 sq. km. with almost
1,000,000 inhabitants. Thus, besides the
agricultural districts of Psyczyna and Rybnik,
Poland was to have a considerable part of the
industrial area. Poland was assigned 76 per
cent of the coal mines (59 mines out of 67),
97 per cent of the iron ore, 82 per cent of the
tin, 71 per cent of the lead, 50 per cent
of the sulphur, 50 per cent of the coke, all
the tin-works and lead-works (a total of I),
all the flax-spinning mills·, 5 tin-rolling
mills out of 9, about 50 per cent of the ironworks, the power-station and the factory
of nitrogen products of Chorzow. 79
The League Council not only traced the line which was to divide
Upper Silesia but, taking into consideration the economic bonds, the
water-supply and electric systems, the mutual exchange of raw materials
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and semi-manufactured products by the different concerns, and the
location of the workmen's settlements, which closely linked the industrial
district together, the Council, also, proposed that for a period of
fifteen years special regulations concerning the economic connection of
the two parts with each other and with Germany should be maintained.
The decision thus rendered by the Council though painful to both Poland
and Germany was, nevertheless, accepted by them.

To ensure the observance

of the obligations of each nation, a Mixed Commission was set up at
Katowice, and a Tribunal of Arbitration at Benthen, under presidents
appointed by. the League of Nations.

Legally, the German minority of

Upper Si1esia was, until July 15th., 1937, better protected than the other
national minorities in Poland.

The final decision of the Council

contains the following stipulations:
A Minorities Office is to be set up in both
portions of the Plebiscite territory.
Persons belonging to a minority may, after
having filed a complaint with the highest
Administrative authority, submit a petition
to the Minorities Office of their State for
consideration. If the Minorities Office
does not succeed in obtaining satisfaction
for the petitioners, it shall transmit the
petition, together with any comments it may
wish to make to the chairman of the Mixed
Commission for his opinion. The Chairman will
afford the members of the Mixed Commission
opportunity to express their views. (The
Mixed Commission is composed of two Germans
and two Poles, and a Chairman of some other
nationa1ity--Artic1e 562 of the Convention).
The Chairman will then make known his opinion
to the Minorities Office, which will communicate
it to the proper administrative authorities.
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In case the petitioners are not satisfied
with the findings of the administrative
authori ty, they may appeal to the Council
of the League of Nations. Such appeals must
be addressed to the Minorities Office, which
will see that they are forwarded to the
Council by the Government. The Council of
the League of Nations is also competent to
give a decision concerning any individual or
collective petition addressed to it directly
by persons belonging to a minority. 80
However trivial or improbable the offenses, the League was bound
to take official notice of them and request explanations from the Polish
Government.

As a consequence many problems concerning the German

minority in Poland came before this former international body.
The minority problem is not Wholly
economic or cultural but embraces many other
of the complexities of group life. Consequently the disputes which have arisen between
the German minority and the Polish government
have been as diverse as they have been frequent.
The conflicts in Posen and Pomorze in the first
years after the ratification of the peace
.
treaty were mostly concerned with liquidating
German property, but most of the German complaints from Polish Upper Silesia center on
the entrance requirements for German minority
schools.. The Poles, seeking to consolidate
a national Polish State, naturally wish to
limit the number of children attending the
minority schools. During the years following
the partition the German vote in Polish Upper
Silesia increased each election and there was
a corresponding increase in the number of
children registered in the German schools.
But after the Polish election campaign in
November, 1930, in Which physical violence
accompanied intimidation, the German minority
in Polish Upper Silesia was weakened. Protests
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to the League followed and after long and
serious negotiations the Council of the
League in Sept., 1931, settled ~he difficulties
arising from these occurences. 1
When Germany joined the League and became a member of the Council
in 1926 she obtained the right to intervene on behalf of her minority
in Poland.

This right was constantly exercised by Germany in the years

that followed.

The Poles are probably correct in saying:
that no other government abused this privilege
as much as the government of the German
Republic. In order to foster revisionist
propaganda and to keep the "Corridor"
question before world opinion, the Weimar
regime brought innumerable complaints before
the League Council and the World Court.
In Poland's eyes, the German minority came
to occupy quite a different position from
that of other nationalities; the Germans
were looked upon as enemies of the state,
a docile instrument of German propaganda. 82

With Hitler, the situation changed.

Through money and violence he

tried to nazify the German minorities in other countries, but he did not
support their rights as citizens.
In the case of Poland, he gave far less
protection and help to the Germans than did
the Weimar regime. Furthermore, the policy
of the Nazis toward their own minorities
deprives them of the moral right of protesting
against the oppression of Germans in foreign
lands. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem,
in spite of the millions spent by the Hitler
regime to promote Nazism among Germans abroad
and to intensify German nationalism, the
81 Article: "Polish-German Dispute fl
June, 1933, 274.
, 82 Buell, 243.

-

S. Stone.

Current History. 38:

56
result of Nazi policy is the weakening of the
position of the German minority in Poland. 83
Though the right of appeal to the League of Nations was employed
by the German minority particularly, the Jews, on the other hand,
submitted but a negligible number of petitions to Geneva.

Out of but

three occasions when complaints of a collective nature were forwarded
to the League in the interest of a Jewish minority, only one was of
Polish origin.

The Berheim Petition in 1933, was a

~rotest

application of Nazi racial legislation in Upper Si1esia.

against the

The case was

won by the complainants.
The Jews, unlike other minorities had never formed part of a
majority in any European state; consequently they received no instructions
from powerful outside sources.

They were acutely conscious of the need

for good relations with the State within which they lived and, though
they fought consistently against any discrimination within their own
state, they were reluctant to address any appeal to an international
body, believing that winning a case against their own Government would
result in only a Pyrrhic victory at best.
However the Jewish problem of Poland was brought to the attention
of the League by the Polish

r~vernment,

itself, in 1936, when Colonel

Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister, called the attention of the Council
to the Polish population problem and to the interest of his country
in the Mandate system.
83
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On October 5th, 1936 Mr. Rose, representing
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foland at a meeting of the economic committee of the Assembly of the
League of Nations, stated:
that emigration was a very important problem
in many countries and had many aspects the
seriousness of which should not be underestimated. In Poland, for instance, the
emigration of Jews to Palestine was one of
the factors which led to the introduction
of foreign exchange control. At the same
Assembly, in 1936, Mr. Komarnicki, the
permanent delegate of Poland to the League
of Nations, discussed the interest of Poland
in the development of Palestine. Poland,
he added, possessed a large Jewish population
which must emigrate. It was, therefore,
desirable to find other outlets for the overpopulated area~ of Central Europe, outside
of Palestine. 4
Thus, Poland, a State ordinarily jealous of herown sovereignty,
and resentful of any interference in her internal affairs, thought it
advisable to turn to the League of Nations for support.
The Jewish minority in Poland, also, was to suffer added injuries
from the neighboring State of Germany, for when Hitler took power there
at the beginning of 1933,
the Nazis extended their anti-Jewish drive
to the whole world. They financed both the
German minority in Poland and Polish antiSemitic propaganda, hoping thus not only to
hurt Jews but to win the sympathy even of the
Polish nationalists, who heretofore had been
the enemies of Germany. Thus, the younger
National Democrats opposed the traditional
anti-German policy of the party, pushed the
Hitlerist "solution" of the Jewish question,
and finally, in 1934, seceded from the party and
created the National Radical party, "Nara a.
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The older National Democratic party was
forced to follow. It also became more and
more "radical" in its anti-Jewish program. 85
Suddenly, all the deep-seated grievances against the Jews were
brushed aside and swallowed up by a new danger that threatened Poland
and in the incredible devastations of a new World War, the Jews rallied
along with other groups to the defence of the Fatherland. 86
Though public opinion interested in minority questions has by no
means had an unreserved admiration for the Geneva system and has even,
at times, adopted an openly critical attitude toward it, still the
system during its twenty-year life span achieved along with the redress
of individual grievances many notable results.

The two decades which

marked the birth and development of the League were periods of political
and social conflicts of almost unprecedented magnitude.

International

equilibrium and internal balance weighed on unstable conditions.

The

political immaturity of new States and the virtual chaos from which
many countries emerged after the first World War promised but little
substantial security for the League1s endeavors.

We can only judge

fairly of its operations viewing it in the light of this unfavorable
setting.

86 Ibid., 203, 204.

CONCLUSION
No single problem in Europe is so acute as that of minorities.
Within every state there can be found diversity of blood, language,
and culture.

"Differences of culture often reach back across the

centuries and are perpetuated through song and saga, folk dances, feast
days and fast days, and in the woof and web of folk ways and mores. It 87
Only in nations in which minority groups, themselves, have sought to
amalgamate with the dominant group lIls assimilation been possible and
then, only over a period of several generations.
It cannot be enforced from the top. History
is replete with illustrations of the failure
of mandatory conformity. Armenians retained
their culture through nearly a thousand years
of persecution. Bohemia remained Czech through
the 500 years of shifting governmental allegience,
and Poland retained its cultural autonomy
though divided, like Gaul, into three parts
for more than a century. The peasant cottage
much more than the homes of the upper classes
is the stronghold of minority cultures,
frequently buttressed by the church and the
market plaee. The theory of assimilation will
not, at least in our generation, be translated
into reality. 88
All human beings, whether members of national majorities or minorities
are primarily interested in the respect of fundamental human rights:
life, liberty--freedom of expression and worship--and the pursuit of
happiness.

Nationality is based on community of culture; thus it is but

natural that each national majority should seek the retBnsion of its

87 Brown, 44.
88 ~., 46-47.
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minorities.

But that it has done so, at times, at the expense of the

fundamental human rights deprives it of justification.

It was in the

hope of offering some measure of security against such action that the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers created and gave their support
to the League of Nations, hoping, thereby, to guarantee and effective
plan of protection for the Minorities.

The treaties which incorporated

this protective measure were part of a system which
was intended to ensure that, in the future,
action taken in defense of the rights of
minorities should, both in fact and in public
opinion, be taken without reference to the
special interests of any individual Power.
At the same time, they secured the not less
essential result that the loyalty of the
minorities to the state of which they form a
part should not be exposed to the special
temptations arising from a faculty of direct
intervention given to a neighbouring state with
which they might have special affinities of
race or of sentiment. The purpose of the
treaties was to ensure that the minorities
should, for the future, enjoy conditions which
would enable them, without loss of their
religious or cultural heritage, to bring the
State of which they now form a part, that
loyal cooperation on Which was stressed the
importance that nothing should be done to
impair these principles.
In the second place, both the authors
of the Treaties, and the Council in developing
its procedure, have been at pains to avoid
creating a situation which would place the
Government of any State having undertaken
obligations, and any minority or member of a
minority within that State, in a position
analogous to that of parties opposed to
one another in legal or arbitral proceedings.
The authors of the treaties deliberately
rejected any proposal Which could give countenence
to the conception of any minority forming a
separate corporation within the State.
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If the Council decided that petitions relating
to the treatment of minorities, whether received
from members of a minority or not, should~
under certain conditions, be communicated. to
its members, it made it clear that it regarded
these petitions solely as sources of information, and that the only parties to any action
which might arise there from would be the
Governments of individual members of the
Councilor the Council itself. Here, again,
we have a principle which is not only clearly
a part of the system as laid down in the
treaties, but whose maintenance is essential
to their satisfactory working on behalf of
the Governments and the minorities concerned. 89
The origin and pur:nose of the Minorities Treaties is clearly expressed
in a letter addressed by Clemenceau on June 24th, 1919, to Paderewski
when in its final form the text of the Polish Treaty was communicated to
him.
In formally communicating to you the
final decision of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers in this matter, I should
desire to take this opDortunity of exolaining
in a more formal manner than has hitherto
been done the considerations by which the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers have
been guided in dealing with the question.
1. In the first place, I would point
out that this Treaty does not constitute
any fresh departure. It has for long been
the established procedure of the public law
of Europe that when a State is created, or
even when large accessions of territory are
made to an established state, the jOint and
formal recognition by the Great Powers should be
accompanied by the requirement that such a
State should, in the form of a binding international convention undertake to comply with
certain principles of government. This principle,

89
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for which there are numerous other precedents,
received the most explicit sanction when, at
the last great assembly of European Powers--"
the Congress of Berlin--the sovereignty and
independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and
Roumania were recognized •

.....2.....The
....Principal
..........Allied
.......and
....Associated
.........

Powers are of opinion that they would be false
to the responsibility which rests upon them
if on this occasion they departed from what
has become an established tradition. In this
connection, I must also recall to your consideration the fact that it is to the endeavours
and sacrifices of the Powers in whose name I
am addressing you that the Polish nation owes
the recovery of its independence. It is by
their decision that Polish sovereignty is being
re-established over the territories in question
and that the inhabitants of these territories
are being incorporatep in the Polish Nation.
It is on the supnort which the resources of
these Powers will afford to the League of Nations
that, for the future, Poland will to a large
extent depend for the secure possession of
these territories. There rests, therefore,
upon these Powers an obligation, which they
cannot evade, to secure in the most permanent
and solemn form guarantees for certain essential
rights which will afford to the inhabitants
the necessary protection whatever changes may
take place in the internal constitution of the
Polish State. 90
It is true that the new treaty differed in form from earlier
Conventions dealing with similar matters but this was a "necessary
consequence and an essential part of the new system of international
relations" 91 which the establishment of the League of Nations built up.

90 The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities of Race,
Language ana-Religion,-p7
91
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Experience proved that the older system, where the guarantee for the
execution of similar provisions was invested in the Great Powers, was
ineffective.

If the Peace of the world was to be established and main-

tained protective provisions for the numerous minorities of Europe had
to be seriously considered in the drafting of the treaties that aimed
at so universal a concept.

That such treaties were imposed and signed

was in itself a great contribution to the restoration of that peace in
Europe.
Without the deterrent influence introduced
by the League and without the prospect of
possible redress at Geneva, it is not difficult
to iMagine what Europe would have been like
at the end of the First World War, with all
its passions rampant, with new frontiers, and
a new but uns~ttled balance of domination and
submission. 9
There were positive achievements which marked the experiment, too.
Certain minorities were rescued from ignorance and the level of their
social and cultural state was raised as a consequence; renresentatives
of minority groups began to participate in governmental affairs; and,
in some cases, we find the development of an extensive minorities'
school system.
Confronted with diametrically opposed points of view, and evidences
of both failure and success, it is extremely difficult to arrive at an
objective appraisal of the system of international protection of minorities
as adopted in the peace treaties we have been considering.
92
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purpose of this paper either to condemn or approve the experiment.

One

obvious conclusion might be arrived at in the course of this study, however, and that is that there seems to be no panacea for the minority
problem.

Contradictions face one on every hand.
There are conflicting statistics and there
are claims and counterclaims. Consequently it
is not always possible to find out the truth,
and one cannot be arbitrary in apportioning
praise and blame. In many cases, no doubt,
both sides sincerely believed in their contentions. So we cannot be dogmatic when we are
discussing such an inextricable tangle of ageold conflicts as these. For no human being can
know even a majority of the answers to these
problems which spring up everywhere to create
economic disorder and the threat of war.
But we can set down some conclusions that
will hardly be disputed.
In the first place, we have learned that
in one oart of Europe after another it is
impossible to draw a satisfactory frontier
through mixed nationality areas. For the
existence of minority "islands" makes it
impossible.
Second, we have seen examples of the
exchange of minorities, and we know that it
would be impracticable to attempt to repeat
these migrations on a scale large enough to
relieTe a Europe's minority problems. So
nearly all the minority peoples must stay where
they are, in the lands they and their forefathers have inhabited for centuries.
The third point follows from these. It
is that there is no way by which everybody can
at tain 'self-determination' • For self -determination for one people may mean the invasion of
another people's rights, and if we tried to
give every people in Europe the free rein of
geographical self-determination the result would
be something very much like anarchy.

•
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But, fourth, the persecution or repression
of minorities is no solution either. Perhaps
the best that can be said of it is that sooner
or later it is almost certain to react against
the majority applying it. 93
Poland, by no means, stood alone in Europe with the task of solving
a grave minDrity situation but it certainly presented one of the major
difficulties of this rebuilt state, and occupied more than just a fair
share of the attention of the new world forum, the League of Nations.
The serious problems arising from her mixed national composition and with
which Poland grappled in this post-war era were not new to her historical
experience either, but unawakened national aspirations in the past had
made the task a less difficult one with Which to cop,.

The new state

of Poland rising up between the two great millstones of Russia and
Germany felt that her greatest safeguard lay in a strong national unity.
No obstacle must hinder its achievement.

Her treatment of her minority

peoples was, therefore, not always benevolent or wise, while
the restless fluctuation of shifting parliamentary
coalitions which produced Poland's numerous early
Cabinets, as well as the unstable tenure of local
administrative office under these conditions of
parliamentary government were not at all favourable
to the maintenanc~4of any consistent line of
minority policy.
'
Any comprehensive and constructive program providing for future contin-

gencies with regard to the minority problems of Poland was interrupted
When the disintegration of the State once more set in under the destructive
power of Hitler's invading
93
94

ar~.

Dyboski-Out1ines of Polish History, 92-94.
Dyboski, Poland.,-r56.

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achorn, Erik. European Civilization and Politics since 1815.
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.-"Pr. 819. - - - -

New York:

Azcarte, de P. League £! Nations ~ National Minorities, ~ Experiment.
Translated from the Spanish by Eileen E. Brooke. Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. pp. 216.
Baskerville, Beatrice C. The Polish Jew.
Company, 1906. pp. 336:-

New York:

The Macmillan

Benes, Eduard. Eduard Benes, In His Own Words. (Three Score Years of
a Statesman, Builder and Philosopher) I'9IiIi: Czech-American National
Alliance Eastern Division, New York: pp. 136.
BonsaI, Stephen. Unfinished Business.
and Company, Inc., 1944. pp. 313.

Garden City:

Doubleday, Doran

Brom, franciS J., Hodges, Charles, and Roucek, Joseph S. (eds.).
Contemporary World Politics: New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,1940.
Buell, Raymond Leslie.
1939. pp. 364.

Poland: Key to Europe.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

Capek, Thomas, Jr. Origins of the Czechoslovak State.
Revell Press, 1926. pp. I54-.Contemporary Europe.
1941. pp. 610.

A Symposium.

New York:

New York:

The

D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,

Donald, Sir Robert. The Tragedy of Trianon.
Limited, 1926. pp:J48.
-

London:

Thorton Butterworth

Dyboski, Roman. Outlines of Polish History.
Unwin. Ltd., 1925. pp.282.

London:

George Allen and

Poland.
Goodhart, Arthur L.
1920. pp. 194.

New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933. pp. 443.

Poland and the Minori ty

~.

New York: Brentano' s ,

Gottschalk, Max, and Duker, Abraham. Jews in the Post-War World.
York: The Dryden Press, 1945. pp. 224. - - 66

New

67
Haiman, Miecislaus. The ~ of Poland in Contemporary American Opinion.
Chicago: Polish Roman Catholic Union of America, 1935. pp. 271.
Haskins, C. H., and Lord, R. H. Some Problems of the Peace Conference.
Cambridge: Harvard University PreSs, 1920. pp. 307.
Hill, Ninian. Poland and the Polish Question.
1915. pp. 340.
-

New York: F. A. Stokes Co.,

Janowsky, Oscar I. The Jews and Minority Rights.
University Press, 193~~19.
Machray, Robert. The Poland of Pilsudski.
Inc., 1937. pp~8.

New York: Columbia

New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,

Osborne, Sidney. (ed.). The Problem of Upper Si1esia.
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1921. pp. 18D:' -

London: George

Paprocki, S. J. (Recuei1 d'informations sous 1a direction de). Institute
pour l'Etude des Questions Minoritaires, Varsovie, Kro1ewska 7. 1935.
pp. 173. La Pologne et Ie Prob1eme des Minorites.
Phillips, Charles.

Paderewski.

New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934. pp. 563.

Reddaway, W. F., Penson, J. H., Ha1ecki, 0., and Dyboski, R. (eds.).
Cambridge History ~ Poland, from Augustus II to Pi1sudski. London:
Cambridge university Press, 1941. Two Vo1s.
Robinson, Jacob, Karvach, Oscar, Laserson, Max M., Robinson, Nehemiah,
and Vichniak, Marc. Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure! New York:
Institute of Jewish Affairs-Qf the American Jewish-Congress and the
World Jewish Congress. 1943. pp. 349.
Bachar, Abram Leon. A Jew in the Contemporary World.
Knopf, 1939. pp. '58~ - -Schmitt, Bernadotte (ed.).
Press, 1945. pp. 500.

Poland.

Segal, Simon. The New Poland
1938. pp. 2'2J.-

~

New York: A. A.

Berkeley: University of California

the Jews.

New York: Lee Furman, Inc.,

Shotwell, James T. At the Paris Peace Conference.
Co., 1937. pp. 444'.-

New York: The Macmillan

Simonds, Frank H. How Europe Made Peace without America.
Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927. pp. 401.

Garden City:

68
Tardieu, Andre. The Truth about the Treaty.
Co., 1921. PP:-li73.
-

New York: The Bobbs-Merri11

Thomas, William K. and Zanicki, Florian. The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. Two Volumes.

*

*

*

* *

roCUMENTS AND ARTICLES
Duker, A. G. "Jews in Poland: to Get Out Seems the Only Answer but Where
Can They Go?" Current History. 45: 62-7, December, 1936. New York:
New York Times Co.
International Conciliation. Number 222. Documents for the Year 1926.
"The Problem ot: Minorities". September, 1926.
International Conciliation. Number 28A. Documents for the Year 1933.
"Danzig and the Polish Problem." by J. A. Von Hamel. March, 1933.
International Conciliation. Number 353. Documents for the Year 1939.
Text of British White Paper containing British-German Correspondence
concerning Poland. Outline of the German White Book on Final Phases
of German-Riish Crisis. October, 1931. New York: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education.
Kann, J. J. "Jewish Problem in Poland".
August, 1921.

Current History.

Nation. "Jews in Po1and u • 108: 531-2. April 5th., 1919.
Nation, Inc., Fr~da lirchwey, Editor.

145: 776-00.
New York:

Robinson, Jacob. "Minorities and the League of Nations tt • Washington,
D. C. American Council on Public Affairs. pp. 14. Article is a
chapter from "World Organizations", a symposium of the Institute on
WOrld Organization, published by the above. Based on the proceedings
Qf the Institutes' sessions at American University in September, 1941.
Stone, S.
1933.

"Polish-German Dispute".

Current History.

38: 272-8.

June,

Sullkowski, Joseph. "The Problem of International Protection of National
Minori ties. Past Experience as a Basis for Future Solution". New
York: 1944. pp. 40. Reprint from the Quarterly of the Polish Institute
~ Arts and Sciences in America. Oct., 1943. PP:-32.

69
"The Problem of National Minorities in Its Sociological
Aspects'''. Reprint from the Quarterly of the Polish Institute of Arts
and Sciences in America. Oct., 1943. pp. 32.
League of Nations. Essential Facts about
1939. Information Section. pp. 359.

~

League of Nations.

Geneva,

League of Nations. Protection of Minorities in Upper Silesia. Appeal
of the "Deutscher Volkabund" of Polish Silesia concerning the Admission
of Children to the Primary German Minority Schools in the Voivodie of
Silesia. League of Nations, 1927. Publications of the League of
Nations. I. B. Minorities. 1927. I.D. 1. pp. 24.
League of Nations. Protection of Linguistic, Racial or Religious Minoriti~
Resolutions and F~racts from-the Minutes of the Council, Resolutions
and Reports adopted by the Assembly, relating to the Procedure to be
followed in Questions concerning the Protection of Minorities.
Geneva, 1929. pp. 80.
League of Nations. The League of Nations and Minorities. Information
Section, League or-Nations Secretariat, Geneva, 1923. pp. 34.
League of Nations Official Journal. Special Supplement Number 73.
Documents Relating to the Protection of Minorities. (Published in
accordance with the Council Resolution of June 13th., 1921). Geneva,
1929. pp. 87.
League of Nations Secretariat Geneva. The League of Nations and the
Protection of Minorities of Race, Languages and Religion. Information
Section,~eague of Nations Secretariat, Geneva, 1921. Reviled Edition.
pp. 78.

J

•

APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by MOther Jane McKinley, R.S.C.J.
has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.
The final copies have been examined by the director
of the thesis and the signature which appears below
verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been
incorporated, and that the thesis is noW given final
approval with reference to content, form, end mechanical
accuracy.
j,
,I

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

,j

./)

p/fJ

~.~.{/~v.~
ignature of Adviter

